No meu segundo artigo para a School of Politics da Universidade de Nottingham dissertei sobre a nova política americana em relação aos países africanos produtores de petróleo sob o lema da guerra global contra o terrorismo. O artigo foi realizado para a cadeira "Intervention in Africa" da "Lecturer" Catherine Gegout a quem agradeço especialmente pela míriade de fontes actuais disponibilizadas sobre um assunto tão obscuro.
The new American paradigm towards Africa: Oil and the Global War On Terrorism
Doctor Catherine Gegout
University of Nottingham
November 2006
Introduction
Historically, Schraeder argued, “The relationship between the United States and Africa is one characterized in the main by indifference and punctuated by flurries of interest and action.”[1][2] It does in fact seem likely that America’s new geopolitical paradigm towards Africa is simply a quest to secure new oil sources for its next decades’ increasing demand, no matter which rhetoric is in use to enforce its efforts.
There has been a fundamental shift in US policy towards Africa in the last few years with the well known strategy of Global War On Terrorism. Though, a renewal of interest didn’t start with the 9-11-2001 events, but instead since late Clinton administration a new involvement policy had started to be implemented actively, denying the previous assumption of Africa not being a vital interest.
The fundamental premises that this essay aims to address are, that far from any moral imperatives, Clinton’s second mandate and George W. Bush’s both mandates, have shown a new engagement towards Africa. Its intentions as the essay shall argue are to: firstly, secure oil sources for the future as a strategy driven towards satisfaction of US demand within a framework of diversification from its dependence on the sources in the Middle East. Secondly, help friendly regimes in power through mainly military assistance programmes. Thirdly, expand the Global War On Terrorism rhetoric to Africa in order to legitimise active military intervention in African territory to further ensure the safety of the oil fields and plants.
Economic relations
The United States’ trade policy has had a virtual engagement towards Africa since Clinton’s second mandate (1998 to 2001). Through the “Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa” or “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (AGOA), it promised to deliver more private investment and facilitate imports from a cluster of states that would be crucial allies for future widening of US presence. However, there has been ever since a remarkable lack of US private investment and interest only countered by the US oil companies’ expansion in the region as well as US policies to “help African countries to secure their resources”.
The AGOA was a package of rewards for market reforms aimed towards applicant African countries. This would allow further American private investment as mutual barriers to trade would be broken.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets.[3]
In other words, the AGOA was an initiative aimed at creating conditions for US companies to lead a virtual take-off of African growth which would be created and the peace dividend would be greater (for both).
2002 2003 2004 2005
U.S. Exports 6,026.1 6,870.9 8,438.5 10,314.7
U.S. Imports 17,891.4 25,633.3 35,879.5 50,289.7
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census[4]
Nevertheless, few in Africa must believe this rhetoric as the latest figures show that in the last years African non-oil exports to the US account now for a mere 7 percent of the total. Oil is in fact all of what US-Africa trade relations are about.
In fact the AGOA initiative failed completely in bringing to reality hopes of development of entrepreneurship or equitative development and poverty relief. Instead, the top five AGOA beneficiary countries are the five oil richest, these are Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, South Africa, and Chad. Furthermore, the weight of non oil exports of these countries remains insignificant. The main beneficiaries of the widening of custom free practises are then the US oil companies and the corrupt governmental elites which not only charge “signing bonuses” but also have made disappear a great part of the oil revenues.
These measures were both a reflection of the negative perspective towards past “inefficient aid” to Africa and the Clinton administration’s adoption of the “trade not aid” formula. Indeed, US gross aid had reached 2.4$Bn in 1985 at the height of the cold war, then dropped to 1.2$Bn by 1990[5] and down to mere 650$Mn by 1997, which, along with accumulated inflation together with African growing debt meant that aid was insignificant. Today, it is known that US channels 0.1 percent of its GNP to aid but from these roughly US10$Bn, only 10%, US1$Bn are entitled to Sub-Saharan Africa.
During the George W. Bush tenure, the prior American focuses on aid and on trade would be remarkably phased out by the unimportance of bilateral trade and disbelief on aid efficiency. In 2000, when George W. Bush “in the course of a presidential debate with Vice President Albert Gore, was questioned about United States’ foreign policy towards Africa, he responded that we do not have any vital interests there.”[6] As a matter of fact this statement reproduced the Neo-Conservative American view.
However, in May 2001, just four months before the 9-11 attacks, Vice-President Dick Cheney, an ex Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton (an oil production services provider), was chairing the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPD) and delivered a grim outlook for energy. The USA had consumed 17 percent more energy in the 1990 decade than in the previous ten years, while its domestic output had only been able to rise 2.3 percent. In the 2000-2020 period, the group expected the consumption figure to increase to 32 percent. Meanwhile, the US domestic production has decreased about 40 percent from early 1970’s to 2000. It is expected to keep on decreasing progressively given that oil imports have more than doubled and have passed the 50 percent barrier in late 1990’s. The total import output should reach the 75 percent figure by 2020 to keep the US economy “well oiled” and robust.
Taking these conclusions to heart, the strategic solution sought was to review its world’s oil source sites. After all, most foreign petroleum partners seemed either at the wrong place, as Saudi Arabia’s two month shipping distance, or with the “wrong regime”, as Chávez’ Venezuela.
Furthermore, the African outlook for oil extraction is quite encouraging. Angola and Nigeria already supply about 15 percent of U.S. oil imports and U.S. officials predict that African oil imports will reach 25 percent of their country’s crude imports by 2015, more than the whole Persian Gulf would. Identified oil reserves in Africa rose from 58Bn barrels in 1984 to 112Bn barrels in 2004. Today African production exceeds eight million barrels, roughly 10 percent of world production but the 20 percent mark can be reached by 2015.
As to the US oil companies, from which many US state advisors and State Secretary Condoleezza Rice comes from (she was director at Chevron Texaco), have never invested so much. The US governmental promises of making African oil producing countries safer is in complete harmony with the boards of US oil companies’ interests, providing them the opportunity to expand in Africa in the right time as they have been accounting larger profits than ever due to the rise in oil prices. For example, Exxon-Mobil in 2005 reported the biggest profit in world’s history, US$36Bn.
The oil price bolstering Iraq war (from 2003 to 2005), was seen to have enduring effects at least throughout 2006 and US companies took the momentum to expand. ESSO invested nearly US$10Bn in three deep-sea oil exploitation projects in Angola. In addition, ExxonMobil invested hugely in an oil pipeline about one thousand kilometres long to transport oil from Cameroon to Atlantic coast. However, another US oil giant, Chevron-Texaco, planned to invest US$20Bn in the next five years to expand its production capability in Africa. Therefore, the US government can be recognised as the far reaching arm of the US oil corporate interests.
Military relations
The operation “Restore Hope” in Somalia 1992-1994 made America’s willingness to intervene directly in Africa decrease dramatically. Thereafter the US government sought softer means of defending its regional allies and announced the creation of the “African Crisis Response Initiative” (ACRI) in October 1996. This programme intended to enhance the capacity of “friendly” African militaries, which came in line with an ideological background of leaving the Africans fighting their own wars, though with US training and weapons.
However, with the new linkage between Africa and US national (resource) security, the Bush administration refurbished the ACRI program to its today’s “African Contingency Operations Training Assistance” (ACOTA) program in order to further bolster the ability of African military forces to protect access to oil resources from “terrorist hands”. Events such as Liberia’s 2003 internal war further demonstrated US unwillingness to intervene where there are no “vital (resource) interests”.
After the launch of ACRI, in October 1997 Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice defined two pillars for Clinton’s last mandate policy for Africa:
“Seek to accelerate Africa’s full integration into the global economy... (and) defend the United States from threats to our national security that emanate from Africa... Terrorism, international crime, narcotics, weapons proliferation and disease.”[7]
Hereby, somehow, it anticipated the (alleged) Al Qaeda (literally The Base) embassy attacks in August 1998 in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. By September of the same year the US Congress was already openly referring to the “need engineering public acceptance for sacrifices of dollars and lives”[8] . It is therefore interesting that the official US argument of terrorism started actually before terrorist attacks did happen in Africa.
Thereafter, the US sought to deepen its ties with a cluster of states to be future regional allies and the initial chosen were the new post-Apartheid South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda and Ghana. The benefit from US military expertise and weapons was at stake for these states’ governments, subsequent improvements in their military capability would provide local regimes a good guarantee to survive in power.
But it was in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks that American and European media attention turned more towards Africa, especially to the Western Sahara Desert. This was due to US intelligence flooding the media with rumours that Al-Qaeda’s top personnel would move rapidly from US invaded Afghanistan to seek shelter in the open and desolate areas of Northern Africa’s Sahara Desert. There it could be safe from US supervision as well as where it would engage new threats to both American and European security. As Westerwelt for American radio NPR hinted:
“Experts speculate the heavy U.S. presence in Afghanistan has pushed Al Qaeda operatives into northern and central Africa. In response, the U.S. military has increased counter-terrorism training for local forces on the continent. Critics say the United States is relying on politically weak states with militaries that have shoddy human rights records.” [9]
A series of news reports on terrorist attacks and hostage taking of European citizens by the allegedly Al-Qaeda related “Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat” (GSPC) include a German convoy in Algeria in 2003 and the bombing of the “Casa de España” in Morocco. Also, the 11th March bombing of Madrid’s railway stations has supposedly been held by Maghreb based Al-Qaeda cell.
GSPC’s alleged actions came in hand to support the official discourse by the US that organized terrorist groups had been emerging in North African countries creating a major threat of militant Islamic expansion to the neighbouring countries to the south.
International Security “experts” rushed to explain the danger of their great mobility possibilities as they could move freely through the Sahel side of the Sahara Desert reaching Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria and collect Islamic support to topple local governments. According to these experts’ view, the terrorist’s intention was to establish a new bastion for the so called “axis of evil”. On the other hand, also Europeans should feel threatened and in turn give support to actions designed to curb these terrorist groups from developing in its own “backdoor”.
The following excerpt from the Washington Post shows how far the Algerian “experts” are committed to stress the threat represented by the GSPC and its important role in international terrorism.
"The leadership of al-Qaeda doesn't have a secure base left anywhere else in the world," said Liess Boukraa, a terrorism expert and author in Algiers. "So al-Qaeda needs the GSPC at the logistical level. The GSPC needs al-Qaeda at the ideological level."[10]
Through “terrorist uprising” based and ravaging in the “out of sight” and “beyond verification” vast desert site, the Algerian Sahel Sahara was deemed to be the perfect location for an “elaborate deception on the part of Algerian and US military intelligence services”.[11] The US has even been granted the right to use the airfield at Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria to deploy special surveillance airplanes.
The fact is that Algeria has had its establishment fighting to keep out an Islamic party from reaching power through bloody repression for more than 15 years. Successive Algerian governments have been either ignored or subjected to embargo from great part of the international community, especially concerning the weapons trade. It has long been an opportunity to grasp international help to secure power and, as GWOT lasts as a major American official rhetoric, a “troubled” Algeria is set to have a good outlook of US direct aid.
Initially with the GSPC problem routed in Algeria’s Sahara, the US has just concluded the Flintlock 2005 training programme which dispatched 1000 Special Forces troops to the countries of Mauritania, Chad, Mali and Niger within the US’s Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), designed to provide anti-terrorism training to the region's military. The reasoning for training these militaries was the widely reported proliferation of GSPC’s and Al-Qaeda’s activities in the vast region’s escapades.
Nonetheless, voices have arisen to point out GSPC as a “façade” of Algerian intelligence in order to make its regime collect dividends out of the American “crusade” against terrorism. As Jeremy Keenan, a UK expert on Sahara told BBC "Probably 90% of the Saharan population just knows that the GSPC is just a pseudonym for the Algerian security services, and there's a lot of truth in that."[12]
Meanwhile, US Special Forces troops trained battalions the local authoritarian governments want to see “beefed-up” for their own protection instead of border troops which would ensure that the terrorist groups would not trespass. All of this with the connivance of the US military as reported by the Washington Post:
“The U.S.-trained battalion is commanded by Deby's (Chad’s president) nephew, Maj. Hardja Idriss, and is part of a regiment assigned to protect an authoritarian and increasingly unpopular president. Deby survived an attempted coup last year, and his grip on power remains fragile. "It just makes sense. They're the president's guard, and so in this region, with all the coups and stuff, you'd want them the best trained," said Capt. Jason, the team leader.”[13]
An additional American terrorist concern lies on the Eastern side of Africa, in the Horn of Africa. In Djibouti the US holds the Camp Lemonier military base with a 2000 men strong garrison plus an amphibious force and its USS Mount Whitney warship headquarters. This triangle of American strength acts as an information and operational hub in the region including the Yemen and Saudi Arabia terrorist connections.
According to General John Sattler, from Djibouti US officials conduct a mission that seeks to "detect, disrupt, defeat and deny [terrorist activities] by taking away their perceived safe havens, taking away their external assistance and the material support”[14]. It is indeed from Djibouti’s base that US military carry out covert operations and known operations such as the bombing of suspected Al-Qaeda facilities in Khartoum in 1998 just after the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam embassy attacks.
Another operational US base is located in the Diego Garcia Island, a UK possession in the Mauritius archipelago renowned for its role in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and where it officially stockpiles military equipment to arm its battalions when needed.
But America’s most significant military interaction with Africa is its “assistance programs”.
“The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is used to provide professional training to African military officers from forty-four countries at U.S. military colleges and other military facilities in the U.S. In FY 2007, IMET expected to provide training to some 1,400 officers from Sub-Saharan and North African countries (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $15.6 million.”[15]
Foreign Military Sales to African states (including North Africa) rose from $39.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to $59.8 million in FY 2006[16]. In oil rich Nigeria alone “US Defense Department awarded Nigeria US$6Mn worth of sales licences in military equipment by US companies supplemented with US$1,65Mn military training assistance to cover the costs of training 300 Nigerian Officers.”[17]
Hence, it is clear that it all sums up to an agenda centred on oil security and such commitment on supporting militarily governments, which actively promote repression as their way of survival due only to their sovereign over the much valued resource.
Conclusion
Under the rhetoric of bringing trade (with the AGOA programme) to Africa as a solution to its poverty problems, the promotion of human rights respect, AIDS/HIV fight, effective democracy and development aid have been pushed towards the background as oil interests and “war against terror” became the only variables of US interest.
The question about USA-Africa relations now is not whether Africa will be ignored as it has been in the past but what will the consequences of the conservative policies be in the countries where the US is intervening.
In the course of W. Bush’s tenure, a sharp increase of oil revenue and military “aid” has been channelled to countries such as Nigeria, Algeria or Chad which has made these countries’ governments significantly stronger. This allowed them to gain momentum in their fights against other internal groups’ long-lasting insurrections and decisively enforce their own status quo. The underlying danger is the one of the strengthening of US-backed regimes which offers their populations but to filch the increasing natural resource revenues and keep a strong authoritarian fist to any opposers.
The truth seems to be that there is no compassionate conservatism in the US policies towards Africa but only a pragmatic embassy of US oil companies interests alongside African governments.
The losers in all the millionaire deals will continue to be the African peoples, denied, as always, to entitle a fair share of the profit as autonomous civil societies, which will remain a mirage under their leaders’ grips.
Finally, US strategy of expansion of Global War On Terrorism to Africa may bluntly prove itself counterproductive. After all, it can boost social resistance to US presence and trigger actual Terrorism against itself as it becomes related to authoritarian regimes relying on US military “aid” and petrodollars.
Bibliography
US Department of Commerce official website, www.commerce.gov
US Department of State official website, www.state.gov
AGOA official website, www.agoa.gov
BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk
NPR (American National Public Radio)
The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com
Alden, C, 2000, “From Neglect to Virtual Engagement: the United States and its new Paradigm for Africa”, African Affairs No.99.
Biel,R, 2003, “Imperialism & International Governance: The Case of US Policy towards Africa”, Review of African Political Economy No.95.
Diemond,J., 2006, Market Access & Compliance/Office of Africa, Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,March 2006, http://www.agoa.gov/resources/US-African%20Trade%20Profile%202006.pdf
Hentz, J.J, 2005, ”The Contending currents in United States involment in sub-Saharan Africa” in Africa in international Politics: External Involvement in the Continent, Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, New York, Routledge
Keenan, J, 2004, “Terror in the Sahara: The Implications of US Imperialism for North & West Africa”, Review of African Political Economy No101
Klare.M.t and Volman, D, May 2004, “Africa’s oil and American National Security”, Current History
Perl, R. 1998, Terrorism: US response to bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A new policy direction?, Congressional Research Service, Report 98-733F
Reno, W, 2001, “How Sovereignity Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States” in T.Callaghy, R.Kassimir and R. Latham (eds) Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa, New York: Cambridge University Press
Schraeder, Peter, 1994, “United States Foreign Policy towards Africa : Incrementalism, crisis and change”, Cambridge University Press
Volman, D, 2006, “US military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2007”, Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, http://acas.prairienet.org/military
[1] Schraeder, Peter, 1994, “United States Foreign Policy towards Africa : Incrementalism, crisis and change”, Cambridge University Press, pp5
[2] Alden, C, 2000, From Neglect to “Virtual Engagement”: The United States and its new Paradigm for Africa, African Affairs,99, pp356
[3] www.agoa.gov/, 2006-11-24, 23h
[4] Diemond,J., Market Access & Compliance/Office of Africa, Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,March 2006, http://www.agoa.gov/resources/US-African%20Trade%20Profile%202006.pdf, 2006-11-23, 23h
[5] Reno, w, 2001, “How Sovereignity Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States” in T.Callaghy, R.Kassimir and R. Latham (eds) Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-215
[6] Hentz, J.J, 2005, ”The Contending currents in United States involvement in sub-Saharan Africa” in Africa in international Politics: External Involvement in the Continent, Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, New York, Routledge, pp.23
[7] Rice, Susan, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, 22 October 1997, African News Service, www.africanews.org
[8] Perl, R. 1998, Terrorism: US response to bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A new policy direction?, Congressional Research Service, Report 98-733F, 1September 1998
[9] Westervelt, Eric, March 8, 2004Morning Edition, www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgdId=3, 2006-11-20, 17.37h
[10] Whitlock, C. Al-Qaeda's Far-Reaching New Partner, Salafist Group Finds Limited Appeal in Its Native Algeria, Washington Post Foreign Service, October 5, 2006; Page A01
[11] Keenan, J. 2004, Terror in the Sahara: the implications of US imperialism for North & West Africa, Review of African Political Economy, Nr101, pp476
[12] Fellows, Catherine, 2005, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4749357.stm, 2006-11-20, 16.49h
[13] Scott Tyson, Ann, Tuesday, July 26, 2005, Washington Post , http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501801.html, 2006-11-20
[14] Matheson, Isabel, 2002, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2573765.stm, 2006-11-20, 18.10h
[15], 16 Volman, D, 2006, “US military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2007”, ACAS, http://acas.prairienet.org/military, (Information on the Commercial Sales program, the U.S. government budget for foreign operations, and U.S. policy toward Africa can be obtained through the web site of the U.S. State Department)
[17]Klare.M.t et al, May 2004, “Africa’s oil and American National Security”, Current History, pp230
And to this we may add Alden’s conclusion, “It has been characterized by the pursuit of commercial activities, be it in the form of slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or oil in the contemporary period.”
Doctor Catherine Gegout
University of Nottingham
November 2006
Introduction
Historically, Schraeder argued, “The relationship between the United States and Africa is one characterized in the main by indifference and punctuated by flurries of interest and action.”[1][2] It does in fact seem likely that America’s new geopolitical paradigm towards Africa is simply a quest to secure new oil sources for its next decades’ increasing demand, no matter which rhetoric is in use to enforce its efforts.
There has been a fundamental shift in US policy towards Africa in the last few years with the well known strategy of Global War On Terrorism. Though, a renewal of interest didn’t start with the 9-11-2001 events, but instead since late Clinton administration a new involvement policy had started to be implemented actively, denying the previous assumption of Africa not being a vital interest.
The fundamental premises that this essay aims to address are, that far from any moral imperatives, Clinton’s second mandate and George W. Bush’s both mandates, have shown a new engagement towards Africa. Its intentions as the essay shall argue are to: firstly, secure oil sources for the future as a strategy driven towards satisfaction of US demand within a framework of diversification from its dependence on the sources in the Middle East. Secondly, help friendly regimes in power through mainly military assistance programmes. Thirdly, expand the Global War On Terrorism rhetoric to Africa in order to legitimise active military intervention in African territory to further ensure the safety of the oil fields and plants.
Economic relations
The United States’ trade policy has had a virtual engagement towards Africa since Clinton’s second mandate (1998 to 2001). Through the “Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa” or “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (AGOA), it promised to deliver more private investment and facilitate imports from a cluster of states that would be crucial allies for future widening of US presence. However, there has been ever since a remarkable lack of US private investment and interest only countered by the US oil companies’ expansion in the region as well as US policies to “help African countries to secure their resources”.
The AGOA was a package of rewards for market reforms aimed towards applicant African countries. This would allow further American private investment as mutual barriers to trade would be broken.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets.[3]
In other words, the AGOA was an initiative aimed at creating conditions for US companies to lead a virtual take-off of African growth which would be created and the peace dividend would be greater (for both).
2002 2003 2004 2005
U.S. Exports 6,026.1 6,870.9 8,438.5 10,314.7
U.S. Imports 17,891.4 25,633.3 35,879.5 50,289.7
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census[4]
Nevertheless, few in Africa must believe this rhetoric as the latest figures show that in the last years African non-oil exports to the US account now for a mere 7 percent of the total. Oil is in fact all of what US-Africa trade relations are about.
In fact the AGOA initiative failed completely in bringing to reality hopes of development of entrepreneurship or equitative development and poverty relief. Instead, the top five AGOA beneficiary countries are the five oil richest, these are Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, South Africa, and Chad. Furthermore, the weight of non oil exports of these countries remains insignificant. The main beneficiaries of the widening of custom free practises are then the US oil companies and the corrupt governmental elites which not only charge “signing bonuses” but also have made disappear a great part of the oil revenues.
These measures were both a reflection of the negative perspective towards past “inefficient aid” to Africa and the Clinton administration’s adoption of the “trade not aid” formula. Indeed, US gross aid had reached 2.4$Bn in 1985 at the height of the cold war, then dropped to 1.2$Bn by 1990[5] and down to mere 650$Mn by 1997, which, along with accumulated inflation together with African growing debt meant that aid was insignificant. Today, it is known that US channels 0.1 percent of its GNP to aid but from these roughly US10$Bn, only 10%, US1$Bn are entitled to Sub-Saharan Africa.
During the George W. Bush tenure, the prior American focuses on aid and on trade would be remarkably phased out by the unimportance of bilateral trade and disbelief on aid efficiency. In 2000, when George W. Bush “in the course of a presidential debate with Vice President Albert Gore, was questioned about United States’ foreign policy towards Africa, he responded that we do not have any vital interests there.”[6] As a matter of fact this statement reproduced the Neo-Conservative American view.
However, in May 2001, just four months before the 9-11 attacks, Vice-President Dick Cheney, an ex Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton (an oil production services provider), was chairing the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPD) and delivered a grim outlook for energy. The USA had consumed 17 percent more energy in the 1990 decade than in the previous ten years, while its domestic output had only been able to rise 2.3 percent. In the 2000-2020 period, the group expected the consumption figure to increase to 32 percent. Meanwhile, the US domestic production has decreased about 40 percent from early 1970’s to 2000. It is expected to keep on decreasing progressively given that oil imports have more than doubled and have passed the 50 percent barrier in late 1990’s. The total import output should reach the 75 percent figure by 2020 to keep the US economy “well oiled” and robust.
Taking these conclusions to heart, the strategic solution sought was to review its world’s oil source sites. After all, most foreign petroleum partners seemed either at the wrong place, as Saudi Arabia’s two month shipping distance, or with the “wrong regime”, as Chávez’ Venezuela.
Furthermore, the African outlook for oil extraction is quite encouraging. Angola and Nigeria already supply about 15 percent of U.S. oil imports and U.S. officials predict that African oil imports will reach 25 percent of their country’s crude imports by 2015, more than the whole Persian Gulf would. Identified oil reserves in Africa rose from 58Bn barrels in 1984 to 112Bn barrels in 2004. Today African production exceeds eight million barrels, roughly 10 percent of world production but the 20 percent mark can be reached by 2015.
As to the US oil companies, from which many US state advisors and State Secretary Condoleezza Rice comes from (she was director at Chevron Texaco), have never invested so much. The US governmental promises of making African oil producing countries safer is in complete harmony with the boards of US oil companies’ interests, providing them the opportunity to expand in Africa in the right time as they have been accounting larger profits than ever due to the rise in oil prices. For example, Exxon-Mobil in 2005 reported the biggest profit in world’s history, US$36Bn.
The oil price bolstering Iraq war (from 2003 to 2005), was seen to have enduring effects at least throughout 2006 and US companies took the momentum to expand. ESSO invested nearly US$10Bn in three deep-sea oil exploitation projects in Angola. In addition, ExxonMobil invested hugely in an oil pipeline about one thousand kilometres long to transport oil from Cameroon to Atlantic coast. However, another US oil giant, Chevron-Texaco, planned to invest US$20Bn in the next five years to expand its production capability in Africa. Therefore, the US government can be recognised as the far reaching arm of the US oil corporate interests.
Military relations
The operation “Restore Hope” in Somalia 1992-1994 made America’s willingness to intervene directly in Africa decrease dramatically. Thereafter the US government sought softer means of defending its regional allies and announced the creation of the “African Crisis Response Initiative” (ACRI) in October 1996. This programme intended to enhance the capacity of “friendly” African militaries, which came in line with an ideological background of leaving the Africans fighting their own wars, though with US training and weapons.
However, with the new linkage between Africa and US national (resource) security, the Bush administration refurbished the ACRI program to its today’s “African Contingency Operations Training Assistance” (ACOTA) program in order to further bolster the ability of African military forces to protect access to oil resources from “terrorist hands”. Events such as Liberia’s 2003 internal war further demonstrated US unwillingness to intervene where there are no “vital (resource) interests”.
After the launch of ACRI, in October 1997 Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice defined two pillars for Clinton’s last mandate policy for Africa:
“Seek to accelerate Africa’s full integration into the global economy... (and) defend the United States from threats to our national security that emanate from Africa... Terrorism, international crime, narcotics, weapons proliferation and disease.”[7]
Hereby, somehow, it anticipated the (alleged) Al Qaeda (literally The Base) embassy attacks in August 1998 in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. By September of the same year the US Congress was already openly referring to the “need engineering public acceptance for sacrifices of dollars and lives”[8] . It is therefore interesting that the official US argument of terrorism started actually before terrorist attacks did happen in Africa.
Thereafter, the US sought to deepen its ties with a cluster of states to be future regional allies and the initial chosen were the new post-Apartheid South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda and Ghana. The benefit from US military expertise and weapons was at stake for these states’ governments, subsequent improvements in their military capability would provide local regimes a good guarantee to survive in power.
But it was in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks that American and European media attention turned more towards Africa, especially to the Western Sahara Desert. This was due to US intelligence flooding the media with rumours that Al-Qaeda’s top personnel would move rapidly from US invaded Afghanistan to seek shelter in the open and desolate areas of Northern Africa’s Sahara Desert. There it could be safe from US supervision as well as where it would engage new threats to both American and European security. As Westerwelt for American radio NPR hinted:
“Experts speculate the heavy U.S. presence in Afghanistan has pushed Al Qaeda operatives into northern and central Africa. In response, the U.S. military has increased counter-terrorism training for local forces on the continent. Critics say the United States is relying on politically weak states with militaries that have shoddy human rights records.” [9]
A series of news reports on terrorist attacks and hostage taking of European citizens by the allegedly Al-Qaeda related “Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat” (GSPC) include a German convoy in Algeria in 2003 and the bombing of the “Casa de España” in Morocco. Also, the 11th March bombing of Madrid’s railway stations has supposedly been held by Maghreb based Al-Qaeda cell.
GSPC’s alleged actions came in hand to support the official discourse by the US that organized terrorist groups had been emerging in North African countries creating a major threat of militant Islamic expansion to the neighbouring countries to the south.
International Security “experts” rushed to explain the danger of their great mobility possibilities as they could move freely through the Sahel side of the Sahara Desert reaching Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria and collect Islamic support to topple local governments. According to these experts’ view, the terrorist’s intention was to establish a new bastion for the so called “axis of evil”. On the other hand, also Europeans should feel threatened and in turn give support to actions designed to curb these terrorist groups from developing in its own “backdoor”.
The following excerpt from the Washington Post shows how far the Algerian “experts” are committed to stress the threat represented by the GSPC and its important role in international terrorism.
"The leadership of al-Qaeda doesn't have a secure base left anywhere else in the world," said Liess Boukraa, a terrorism expert and author in Algiers. "So al-Qaeda needs the GSPC at the logistical level. The GSPC needs al-Qaeda at the ideological level."[10]
Through “terrorist uprising” based and ravaging in the “out of sight” and “beyond verification” vast desert site, the Algerian Sahel Sahara was deemed to be the perfect location for an “elaborate deception on the part of Algerian and US military intelligence services”.[11] The US has even been granted the right to use the airfield at Tamanrasset, in southern Algeria to deploy special surveillance airplanes.
The fact is that Algeria has had its establishment fighting to keep out an Islamic party from reaching power through bloody repression for more than 15 years. Successive Algerian governments have been either ignored or subjected to embargo from great part of the international community, especially concerning the weapons trade. It has long been an opportunity to grasp international help to secure power and, as GWOT lasts as a major American official rhetoric, a “troubled” Algeria is set to have a good outlook of US direct aid.
Initially with the GSPC problem routed in Algeria’s Sahara, the US has just concluded the Flintlock 2005 training programme which dispatched 1000 Special Forces troops to the countries of Mauritania, Chad, Mali and Niger within the US’s Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), designed to provide anti-terrorism training to the region's military. The reasoning for training these militaries was the widely reported proliferation of GSPC’s and Al-Qaeda’s activities in the vast region’s escapades.
Nonetheless, voices have arisen to point out GSPC as a “façade” of Algerian intelligence in order to make its regime collect dividends out of the American “crusade” against terrorism. As Jeremy Keenan, a UK expert on Sahara told BBC "Probably 90% of the Saharan population just knows that the GSPC is just a pseudonym for the Algerian security services, and there's a lot of truth in that."[12]
Meanwhile, US Special Forces troops trained battalions the local authoritarian governments want to see “beefed-up” for their own protection instead of border troops which would ensure that the terrorist groups would not trespass. All of this with the connivance of the US military as reported by the Washington Post:
“The U.S.-trained battalion is commanded by Deby's (Chad’s president) nephew, Maj. Hardja Idriss, and is part of a regiment assigned to protect an authoritarian and increasingly unpopular president. Deby survived an attempted coup last year, and his grip on power remains fragile. "It just makes sense. They're the president's guard, and so in this region, with all the coups and stuff, you'd want them the best trained," said Capt. Jason, the team leader.”[13]
An additional American terrorist concern lies on the Eastern side of Africa, in the Horn of Africa. In Djibouti the US holds the Camp Lemonier military base with a 2000 men strong garrison plus an amphibious force and its USS Mount Whitney warship headquarters. This triangle of American strength acts as an information and operational hub in the region including the Yemen and Saudi Arabia terrorist connections.
According to General John Sattler, from Djibouti US officials conduct a mission that seeks to "detect, disrupt, defeat and deny [terrorist activities] by taking away their perceived safe havens, taking away their external assistance and the material support”[14]. It is indeed from Djibouti’s base that US military carry out covert operations and known operations such as the bombing of suspected Al-Qaeda facilities in Khartoum in 1998 just after the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam embassy attacks.
Another operational US base is located in the Diego Garcia Island, a UK possession in the Mauritius archipelago renowned for its role in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and where it officially stockpiles military equipment to arm its battalions when needed.
But America’s most significant military interaction with Africa is its “assistance programs”.
“The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is used to provide professional training to African military officers from forty-four countries at U.S. military colleges and other military facilities in the U.S. In FY 2007, IMET expected to provide training to some 1,400 officers from Sub-Saharan and North African countries (excluding Egypt) at a cost of $15.6 million.”[15]
Foreign Military Sales to African states (including North Africa) rose from $39.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to $59.8 million in FY 2006[16]. In oil rich Nigeria alone “US Defense Department awarded Nigeria US$6Mn worth of sales licences in military equipment by US companies supplemented with US$1,65Mn military training assistance to cover the costs of training 300 Nigerian Officers.”[17]
Hence, it is clear that it all sums up to an agenda centred on oil security and such commitment on supporting militarily governments, which actively promote repression as their way of survival due only to their sovereign over the much valued resource.
Conclusion
Under the rhetoric of bringing trade (with the AGOA programme) to Africa as a solution to its poverty problems, the promotion of human rights respect, AIDS/HIV fight, effective democracy and development aid have been pushed towards the background as oil interests and “war against terror” became the only variables of US interest.
The question about USA-Africa relations now is not whether Africa will be ignored as it has been in the past but what will the consequences of the conservative policies be in the countries where the US is intervening.
In the course of W. Bush’s tenure, a sharp increase of oil revenue and military “aid” has been channelled to countries such as Nigeria, Algeria or Chad which has made these countries’ governments significantly stronger. This allowed them to gain momentum in their fights against other internal groups’ long-lasting insurrections and decisively enforce their own status quo. The underlying danger is the one of the strengthening of US-backed regimes which offers their populations but to filch the increasing natural resource revenues and keep a strong authoritarian fist to any opposers.
The truth seems to be that there is no compassionate conservatism in the US policies towards Africa but only a pragmatic embassy of US oil companies interests alongside African governments.
The losers in all the millionaire deals will continue to be the African peoples, denied, as always, to entitle a fair share of the profit as autonomous civil societies, which will remain a mirage under their leaders’ grips.
Finally, US strategy of expansion of Global War On Terrorism to Africa may bluntly prove itself counterproductive. After all, it can boost social resistance to US presence and trigger actual Terrorism against itself as it becomes related to authoritarian regimes relying on US military “aid” and petrodollars.
Bibliography
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The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com
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Biel,R, 2003, “Imperialism & International Governance: The Case of US Policy towards Africa”, Review of African Political Economy No.95.
Diemond,J., 2006, Market Access & Compliance/Office of Africa, Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,March 2006, http://www.agoa.gov/resources/US-African%20Trade%20Profile%202006.pdf
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[1] Schraeder, Peter, 1994, “United States Foreign Policy towards Africa : Incrementalism, crisis and change”, Cambridge University Press, pp5
[2] Alden, C, 2000, From Neglect to “Virtual Engagement”: The United States and its new Paradigm for Africa, African Affairs,99, pp356
[3] www.agoa.gov/, 2006-11-24, 23h
[4] Diemond,J., Market Access & Compliance/Office of Africa, Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census,March 2006, http://www.agoa.gov/resources/US-African%20Trade%20Profile%202006.pdf, 2006-11-23, 23h
[5] Reno, w, 2001, “How Sovereignity Matters: International Markets and the Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States” in T.Callaghy, R.Kassimir and R. Latham (eds) Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-215
[6] Hentz, J.J, 2005, ”The Contending currents in United States involvement in sub-Saharan Africa” in Africa in international Politics: External Involvement in the Continent, Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, New York, Routledge, pp.23
[7] Rice, Susan, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, 22 October 1997, African News Service, www.africanews.org
[8] Perl, R. 1998, Terrorism: US response to bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A new policy direction?, Congressional Research Service, Report 98-733F, 1September 1998
[9] Westervelt, Eric, March 8, 2004Morning Edition, www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgdId=3, 2006-11-20, 17.37h
[10] Whitlock, C. Al-Qaeda's Far-Reaching New Partner, Salafist Group Finds Limited Appeal in Its Native Algeria, Washington Post Foreign Service, October 5, 2006; Page A01
[11] Keenan, J. 2004, Terror in the Sahara: the implications of US imperialism for North & West Africa, Review of African Political Economy, Nr101, pp476
[12] Fellows, Catherine, 2005, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4749357.stm, 2006-11-20, 16.49h
[13] Scott Tyson, Ann, Tuesday, July 26, 2005, Washington Post , http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501801.html, 2006-11-20
[14] Matheson, Isabel, 2002, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2573765.stm, 2006-11-20, 18.10h
[15], 16 Volman, D, 2006, “US military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2007”, ACAS, http://acas.prairienet.org/military, (Information on the Commercial Sales program, the U.S. government budget for foreign operations, and U.S. policy toward Africa can be obtained through the web site of the U.S. State Department)
[17]Klare.M.t et al, May 2004, “Africa’s oil and American National Security”, Current History, pp230
And to this we may add Alden’s conclusion, “It has been characterized by the pursuit of commercial activities, be it in the form of slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or oil in the contemporary period.”
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